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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arises from a complaint for ejectment following nonjudicial foreclosure of a 
deed of trust. Summary judgment was entered ruling the purchaser at the trustee's sale was 
entitled to possession of the subject real property and ejecting the occupant. This appeal 
followed. 
Statement of the Facts 
Respondent, Black Diamond Alliance desires to restate the salient facts. 
On January 19, 2004 Sherry Kimball executed a promissory note payable to Fremont 
Investment & Loan in the amount of $104,800. (Clerk's Record, Val. I,  p. 83). That note was 
secured by a deed of trust executed by Kimball as grantor with Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, I c . ,  (MERS), as beneficiary and nominee of Fremont; that deed of trust was recorded 
January 22, 2004 as Instrument No. 1141336 in the Recorder's Office for Bonneville County, 
Idaho. (Clerk's Record, Val. I, p. 83). 
Beginning September 1, 2006 Kimball failed to make monthly payments on the note. 
(Clerk's Record, Val. I, p. 83). On October 23, 2006 Fremont sent a Notice of Intent to 
Foreclose to Kimball explaining Kimball's default and notifying her that Fremont intended to 
foreclose the deed of trust if Kimball did not cure her default within 30 days. (Clerk's Record, 
When Kimball failed to cure her default, Fremont initiated nonjudicial foreclosure of the 
deed of trust. (Clerk's Record, Val. I ,  p. 84). MERS assigned its beneficial interest in the deed 
of trust to Fremont by written assignment recorded January 22,2007 as Instrument No. 1250938 
in the Recorder's Office for Bonneville County, Idaho. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. 84). On the 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Black Diamond v. Kimball 
Supreme Court #35 189 
same date, Just Law, Inc., was appointed as trustee of the deed of trust. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, 
p 84). 
Kimball received proper notice of the trustee's sale scheduled for 11:OO a.m., May 29, 
2007 at First American Title Company in Idaho Falls, Idaho. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 84). On 
May 29, 2007 Kimball allegedly had a conversation by telephone with representatives of 
Fremont seeking to obtain some forbearance. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 84). Fremont agreed to 
postpone the trustee's sale for May 29, 2007 to allow Kimball time to perform in accordance 
with the discussed forbearance, including an obligation to pay all past due amounts. (Clerk's 
Record, Vol. I ,  p. 84). 
Concomitant with its discussion with Kimball, Fremont directed the trustee to postpone 
the sale scheduled for May 29. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 84). The trustee notified its crier, 
First American, to postpone the May 29 sale. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 84). Accordingly, First 
American publicly announced at 11:OO a.m. on May 29, 2007 that the sale had been postponed 
and rescheduled for 11:OO a.m., June 12,2007. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. 84). 
Prior to the scheduled sale on May 19, 2007 Black Diamond Alliance, LLC, had read in 
the Post Register the legal notice regarding the foreclosure. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. 
I ,  pp. 97-99). Black Diamond performed a drive by inspection of the property and made a 
determination that it could have a value of $145,000. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. 
98). Based upon its determination of potential value, Black Diamond decided to attend the 
foreclosure sale and enter a bid. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I, pp. 97-99). 
On June 12, 2007 First American cried the foreclosure of Kimball's property subject to 
the deed of tmst. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 84). Several bidders were present at the sale and, 
following Fremont's credit bid, entered bids on the property. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, 
I1ESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Black Diamond v. Kimball 
Supreme Court #35189 
Vol. I, pp. 33-48 and 104-107). Ultimately, Black Diamond was the highest bidder at the sale 
on its final bid of $1 12,500. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. 84; Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  
Kimball did not attend the May 29 or the June 12 sales. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. 84). 
At the time of the sale on June 12, Black Diamond had no knowledge of any discussions 
between Fremont and Kimball. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  pp. 11 1). Nor did Black 
Diamond have knowledge of any defects in the foreclosure process. (Supplemental Clerk's 
Record, Vol. I, pp. 1 11). 
On June 13, the day affer the June 12 sale, Black Diamond went to the property and leff 
its business flier with a note on the door for the occupant explaining the purchase of the property 
at foreclosure. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  pp. 109). ARer June 13, and likely aRer 
the recording of the Trustee's Deed, Black Diamond had discussions with Kimball to see if she 
was voluntarily vacating the property. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  pp. 109). 
A Trustee's Deed was executed and recorded June 14, 2007 as Instrument No. 1266637 
in the Recorder's Office for Bonneville County, Idaho conveying title to Black Diamond. 
(Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  pp. 15, 84). First American issued to Black Diamond a policy of title 
insurance dated June 14,2007. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. 84). 
Course of the Proceedings 
Black Diamond filed a Complaint on July 6, 2007 and an Amended Verified Complaint 
on August 17,2007 seeking ejectment of Kimball. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, pp. 5-15). Personal 
service on Kimball could not be accomplished and the court issued an order authorizing service 
by publication. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 1). On October 18, 2007 proof of publication was 
filed together with an application for default. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. I). 
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Kimball filed a notice of appearance on October 26,2007 and after 3-day notice of intent 
to take default was filed, Kiinball filed an answer on November 7,2007. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, 
P 1). 
Black Diamond filed its first motion for summary judgment on January 18, 2008. 
(Clerk's Record, Vol. I, pp. 27-36, 85). Kimball filed a response. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. 
85). 
At the March 6,2008 hearing, counsel for Kimball made the following representation and 
stipulation in open court: "The first issue is that no notice was required to be given on a 
postponed sale. I think we can argue that one today." (Tmnscript March 6, 2008 hearing, p. 5, 
11. 13-16). "As I indicated on the issue of the notice, frankly, it doesn't matter. It [sic] they don't 
have to give any notice of a postponement sale to the debtor, the case is going to be done, and 
I'm not going to play games of, you know, making them go for the formal amendment and that. 
So the Court can decide on that issue." (Transcript March 6, 2008 hearing, p. 8,11.20-25, p. 9,l. 
1). 
Clarifying counsel's position, the district court and counsel had the following colloquy: 
"THE COURT: Let me go back and clarify something you said - I think you said in passing. 
Let me do it in the way of a question: If I find that the notice of continuation given verbally at 
the first sale is sufficient, does that resolve the case? MR. JOHNSON: Yes. THE COURT: So 
can we hear that issue today? MR. MANWARING: Yes. MR JOHNSON: Right." (Tvanscript 
March 6, 2008 hearing, p. 10,11.20-25, p. 11,11. 1-3). 
After considering the arguments of counsel at the March 6, 2008 hearing on Black 
Diamond's motion, the court granted summary judgment to Black Diamond. (Clerk's Record, 
Vol. I, pp. 62, 85); (Tmnscript March 6, 2008 hearing, pp. 17-20). 
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On March 12,2008 Kimball filed a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment. 
(Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  pp. 85). The district court entered on May 15, 2008 its order granting 
Kimball's motion for reconsideration. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  pp. 101-103). 
Black Diamond filed on June 4, 2008 its motion to reconsider. (Supplemental Clerk's 
Record, VoI. I ,  pp. 11-12). Black Diamond filed on August 25, 2008 its second motion for 
partial summary judgment. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I, pp. 30-32). Kimball 
responded in opposition to both motions. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  pp. 78-80). 
On October 24,2008 the district court entered its order granting Black Diamond's motion 
to reconsider and motion for partial summary judgment. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I, 
p. 167). Subsequently,  lick Diamond moved for summary judgment on Kimball's remaining 
claim of unjust enrichment and on January 15, 2009 the district court entered its order granting 
that motion. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. 180). Judgment was entered January 24, 
2009. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. 182). 
Kimball timely filed her third amended notice of appeal. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, 
Vol. I, p. 199). 
Black Diamond has not filed a cross-appeal. 
At no time before the district court did Kimball file a complaint or assert a claim against 
Fremont Investment. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Black Diamond restates the issues on appeal as follows. 
1. Did the district court correctly determine as a matter of law that the trustee 
followed statutory requirements in conducting the nonjudicial foreclosure? 
2. Did the district court correctly conclude as a matter of law that Black Diamond 
was a good faith purchaser for value? 
3. Is Black Diamond entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees on 
appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court reviews a district court's decision on summary 
judgment using the same standard as that properly employed by the trial court 
when originally ruling on the motion. Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on iile show that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Zollinger v. Carvol, 137 Idaho 397,399,49 P.3d 402,404 (2002)(citations omitted). 
A. The District Court correctly determined as a matter of law that the trustee followed 
statutory requirements in conducting the noniudicial foreclosure. 
Kimball contends Idaho's statutory framework for nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of 
trust requires the trustee to give the debtor actual notice of a postponed trustee's sale. 
Construing the applicable statute, the district court determined actual notice of the postponed sale 
was not required. 
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Kimball's sole allegation of defect in the foreclosure process is the lack of actual notice 
to her of the date and time of the postponed trustee's sale rescheduled for June 12. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the appellate court 
exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
When constming a statute, the focus of the Court is to determine and give effect to the intent of 
the Legislature. George K Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 
1385, 1387-88 (1990). Judicial interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the 
statute's literal words. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). Where 
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to the statute as 
written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 
P.2d 685, 688 (1999). The language of the statute must be given its plain, obvious and rational 
meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. Unless the result is palpably absurd, the 
Court assumes the Legislature meant what is clearly stated in the statute. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 
462,988 P.2d at 688. 
o Code $45-1506(8 
The trustee may postpone the sale of the property upon request of the beneficiary 
by publicly announcing at the time and place originally fixed for the sale, the 
postponement to a stated subsequent date and hour. No sale may be postponed to 
a date more than thirty (30) days subsequent to the date from which the sale is 
postponed. A postponed sale may itself be postponed in the same manner and 
within the same time limitations as provided in this subsection. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 
42, 137 P.3d 429 (2006) considered application of the notice provisions contained in the above 
statute. Noting the interplay between $5 1506(8), 1506A, and 1506B, the court observed as 
follows. 
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If the foreclosure has proceeded in compliance with all requirements of 
subsections (2) through and including (6), of section 45-1506, Idaho Code, prior 
to the intervention of the stay, then at the time appointed for the original sale, the 
trustee shall announce the date and time of the rescheduled sale to be conducted at 
the place originally scheduled and no further or additional notice of any kind shall 
he required. So, if no bankruptcy is ever filed and no stay intervenes, 
postponement proceeds according to 5 45-1 506(8). 
Appel, 143 Idaho at 46, 147 P.3d at 433. 
Section 45-1506(8) is plain in its language and obvious in its meaning. When a sale is 
postponed, the trustee shall announce at the time appointed for the original sale the date and time 
of the rescheduled sale and "no further or additional notice of any kind shall be required." LC. 
45-1506B(3)(emphasis added). 
On May 29, 2009 at 11:OO a.m. - the date and time of the originally scheduled sale - the 
trustee's crier announced postponement of the sale and gave the date and time of the rescheduled 
sale - June 12, 2009 at 11:OO a.m. Private investors interested in purchasing at the foreclosure 
sale gained their own personal knowledge of the date and time of the rescheduled sale and 
appeared on June 12 to bid at that sale. 
In accordance with the requirements of Idaho Code, the trustee complied with all 
necessary notice in announcing the rescheduled sale. Kimhall was not entitled to some further or 
additional notice of any kind. 
Moreover, at the time of the summary judgment hearing on March 6, 2008, 
Kimball's counsel stipulated and represented Kimhall's position as follows. "The first issue is 
that no notice was required to be given on a postponed sale. I think we can argue that one 
today." (Transcvipt Mu~ch 6, 2008 hearing, p. 5,11. 13-16). "As I indicated on the issue of the 
notice, frankly, it doesn't matter. It [sic] they don't have to give any notice of a postponement 
sale to the debtor, the case is going to he done, and I'm not going to play games of, you know, 
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making them go for the formal amendment and that. So the Court can decide on that issue." 
(Transcript Mavch 6, 2008 hearing, p. 8,ll. 20-25, p. 9,l. 1). 
Clarifying counsel's position, the district court and counsel had the following colloquy: 
"THE COURT: Let me go back and clarify something you said - I think you said in passing. 
Let me do it in the way of a question: If I find that the notice of continuation given verbally at 
the first sale is sufficient, does that resolve the case? MR. JOHNSON: Yes. THE COURT: So 
can we hear that issue today? MR. MANWARING: Yes. MR JOHNSON: Right." (Transcript 
March 6, 2008 hearing, p. 10,ll. 20-25, p. 11,ll. 1-3). 
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Failure to properly raise such an issue before the district court constitutes a waiver of the 
right to raise the issue on appeal. Roell v. Boise City, 134 Idaho 214, 216, 999 P.2d 251, 253 
(2000). 
ectly determined that LC. (i 1506(8) 
B. The District Court correctly concluded as a matter of law that Black Diamond was a good 
faith purchaser. 
Kimball's sole argument under this issue is that Black Diamond was aware of alleged 
defects in the foreclosure process prior to recording of the trustee's deed, thus preventing Black 
Diamond from being a bona fide purchaser for value. The only alleged defect Kimball has raised 
was the absence of actual notice to her of the postponed sale rescheduled for June 12, 2007. 
There is no dispute that at the time of the rescheduled sale on June 12, Black Diamond had no 
knowledge of any alleged defects in the forecfosure process. 
As the district court observed, there was no dispute that proper notice of default was 
recorded and notice of the May 29,2007 trustee's sale was served on Kimball by certified mail, 
recording, and posting. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I ,  p. 84). 
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purchase and not the recording of title. 
One who relies for protection upon the doctrine of being a bona j d e  purchaser 
must show that at the time of the purchase [they] paid a valuable consideration 
and upon the belief and the validity of the vendor's claim of title without notice, 
actual or constructive, of any outstanding adverse rights of another .... 
Further, one who puvchasespvopevty with sufficient knowledge to put [them], or 
a reasonably prudent person, on inquiry is not a bonajde purchaser. 
Imig v. McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 318,291 P.2d 852, 855 (1955) (citations omitted). 
The undisputed facts noted in the district court's memorandum decision established that 
as of the date and time of the rescheduled sale on June 12,2009 Black Diamond had no notice or 
knowledge of any alleged defects in the foreclosure process. (Supplemental Clerk's Record, 
Vol. 11, p. 109-1 12, 161-163). Accordingly, Black Diamond in good faith purchased the property 
at the foreclosure sale. 
Concerning the requirement of giving value, Kimball only tangentially mentions some 
disparity in value in Appellant's Brief @age 2 - asserting excess equity of $136,000 without any 
factual support; and page 4 - suggesting a birthday gift sale to Black Diamond). The district 
court determined Black Diamond paid value for the property at the foreclosure sale. 
Unquestionably, Black Diamond paid $112,500 for the property at foreclosure. The 
principal amount of Kimball's note in January 2004 was $104,800. Black Diamond's bid 
exceeded that amount by almost $8,000. It is beyond cavil that Black Diamond gave valuable 
consideration for the property. 
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded Black Diamond was a good faith 
purchaser for value at the foreclosure sale. 
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C. Black Diamond is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 
In accordance with I.A.R. 41 and 35(b)(5) and Idaho Code 5 12-120, Black Diamond 
requests on appeal an award of its costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
In its amended verified complaint, Black Diamond requested attorney fees and costs in 
accordance with LC. 5 12-120. (Clerk's Record, Vol. I, p. 11). Section 12-120(3) allows an 
award of attorney fees and costs in any commercial transaction. 
A commercial transaction is any transaction "except transactions for personal or 
household purposes." Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, L.L.C., 143 Idaho 723, 729, 152 P.2d 594, 
600 (2007). A challenge to the validity of a trustee's sale has been considered a commercial 
transaction. Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137,59 P.3d 308 (2002) 
Based upon the nature of the underlying commercial transaction, Black Diamond is 
entitled on appeal to an award of its costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
Additionally, in accordance with I.C. 5 12-121, Black Diamond is entitled on appeal to an 
award of its costs and reasonable attorney fees. Under Section 12-121, attorney fees are awarded 
to the prevailing party only if "the Court determines that the action was brought or pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Balcer v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751, 979 
P.2d 619,624 (1999). 
Explained in further detail, the Idaho Supreme Court has said that "[alttorney fees are 
awardable if an appeal does no more than simply invite an appellate court to second-guess the 
trial court on conflicting evidence." Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 408, 34 P.3d 1085, 
1019 (2001). An award of attorney fees under section 12-121 is also appropriate where the law 
is well-settled and the appellant has made no substantial showing trial court misapplied law. 
Bowles v. Pro Zndiviso, Znc., 132 Idaho 371,377,973 P.2d 142, 148 (1999). 
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Kimball's appeal is without foundation. Kimball's arguments are on legal issues, which 
were well-settled and Kimball has not made a substantial showing that the district court 
misapplied the law. The issues raised presented no new questions of law. 
Black Diamond is entitled on appeal to an award of its costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's summary judgment granting Black Diamond possession of and 
ejecting Kiinball Erom the subject property should be affirmed. 
Dated this 22, day of June 2009. 
Kipp L. Manwaring 
Attorney for Respondent 1' 
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